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WILL WORK FOR FREE: THE LEGALITY OF
UNPAID INTERNSHIPS
ABSTRACT
This Note addresses the current ambiguity in the law regarding if
unpaid interns are employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The
Note explores relevant case law throughout the circuit courts, but primarily
focuses on the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Glatt v. Fox Searchlight
Pictures. It argues that the primary benefits test created by the Second
Circuit in Glatt does not adequately protect unpaid interns nor does it
inform employers of the standards they need to meet in order to adopt legal
unpaid internship programs. Instead, courts should adopt a clearer, more
rigid test that finds an intern not to be an employee under the FLSA if the
following three factors are met: (1) the training is similar to that of which
the interns would receive at an educational institution, (2) the program is
designed to benefit the intern, and (3) the intern does not displace regular
employees. This test is congruent with Congress’s intent of only allowing
for narrow exceptions to overtime and minimum wage compensation under
the FLSA and provides both employers and employees with clearer
guidelines for creating future internship programs.
INTRODUCTION
Kyle Grant made headlines in 2014 for leading a class action lawsuit
against Warner Music Group (Warner) for violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA).1 Grant, who dreams of opening his own record label
one day, worked for the label for eight months as an unpaid intern.2 Unable
to afford an apartment of his own during his internship, Grant lived in a
homeless shelter to make ends meet, while still hoping to fulfill his dream
in the recording industry.3
Unfortunately, Grant’s time with Warner was not the experience he had
hoped for.4 He spent most days doing busy work, which included fetching
coffee and lunches for executives, delivering dry-cleaning, and running
other errands, from which he learned little about the industry he so deeply
wanted to be a part of.5 Inspired by his boss’s remarks that interns should
take advantage of their opportunity and make their efforts stand out by
“coming in earlier, leaving later, be[ing] the first one here, be[ing] the last
one out,” Grant typically spent twelve-hour days at the office.6
1. See, e.g., Zach Schonfeld, Formerly Homeless Unpaid Intern Leading a Lawsuit Against
Warner Music, NEWSWEEK (July 16, 2014, 7:01 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/2014/08/01/unp
aid-internships-warner-music-group-warner-interns-lawsuits-257025.html.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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Unsurprisingly, this grueling (and importantly, unpaid) work schedule had
negative effects on Grant’s life outside of work.7 Grant was enrolled in
classes at the time and his GPA dropped significantly.8 Additionally, the
homeless shelter had an 8 PM curfew and threatened to kick Grant out on
multiple occasions after he did not meet curfew because he had stayed late
at the office.9 Grant claimed that Warner was insensitive to his other
obligations, hassling him when he had to take time off to ensure his food
stamp benefits would continue.10
While a few other interns have told reporters that their time at Warner
opened them up to a host of opportunities after their internships, most have
complaints similar to Grant’s about the program.11 Some have been
working in the program at Warner for around three to four years,12 whereas
most internship programs range between six and twelve months.13 One
intern, who performed hours of tedious data analysis, reported to the media
she was entirely ignored by her supervisor.14 When the intern later inquired
about the possibility of becoming a paid Warner employee, the company
stated that it would be unlikely since so many other individuals were still so
willing to work at the record label for free.15
Grant spent eight months at the label before Warner fired him for taking
an extended lunch break.16 He claims that he was not even given a
scheduled lunch break.17 He further explained that this particular lunch
break was spent in a meeting with the artist and repertoire division of the
company to discuss a new band.18 Grant, upset with how Warner treated
him and his fellow interns, filed a collective action lawsuit in the Southern
District of New York, alleging that, as interns, they fell within the definition
of employees under the FLSA and, thus, Warner was required to pay them
minimum wage and overtime compensation.19 Under the same argument,
other unpaid interns have collectively brought suits against the likes of
Condè Nast, Gawker, Fox Searchlight Media, MSNBC, and Saturday Night
Live among others.20
7. See id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See Nicolas Pologeorgis, The Impact Unpaid Internships Have on the Labor Market,
INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/12/impact-of-
unpaid-internships.asp.
14. Schonfeld, supra note 1.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See FLSA Collective Action Complaint at 6–9, Grant v. Warner Music Group Corp., 2014
WL 4495195 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2013) (No. 13 Civ. 4449).
20. See Schonfeld, supra note 1.
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With steadily emerging unpaid intern cases and decisions, the state of
the law regarding unpaid internships is rapidly developing. Case law
regarding unpaid internships has developed from the Supreme Court’s 1947
decision in Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., which provides guidance on
how to determine when an unpaid trainee is considered an employee under
the FLSA.21 Based on this decision, the Wage and Hour Division (WHD) of
the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) issued a six-factor test (WHD factors)
that private employers must meet when they are not providing interns with
compensation.22 The circuit courts have created several different tests from
what each regards as the proper interpretation of Portland Terminal. The
tests also give various levels of deference to the WHD factors. The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits, for example, in cases involving
unpaid trainees, developed a “totality of the circumstances” test,
considering the WHD factors and the economic realities of the situation.23
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have developed a
“primary benefits” test, analyzing FLSA liability by determining if the
program was designed to primarily benefit the employer or the trainee.24 If
the primary benefit is for the trainee, the employer is not required to
compensate the trainee.25 Recently, in Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit developed its own version of the
primary benefits test, with considerations specifically created to evaluate
modern-day unpaid internship programs.26 The decision in Glatt has gained
national attention, and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has
also adopted the Second Circuit’s approach.27 Additionally, two cases are
currently sitting on appeal in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits in which the
district courts followed the Glatt reasoning.28
This Note argues that the primary benefits test created by the Second
Circuit in Glatt does not adequately protect unpaid interns nor does it
inform employers of the standards they need to meet to adopt legal unpaid
internship programs. The test articulated in Glatt incorporates unnecessary
factors, which obscure analysis and create a vague standard for employers
to follow. Additionally, the test does not encapsulate the policies underlying
21. SeeWalling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150–52 (1947).
22. See U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., FACT SHEET NO. 71: INTERNSHIP
PROGRAMS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (2010) [hereinafter WAGE & HOUR DIV.,
FACT SHEET #71].
23. See, e.g., Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1993); Donovan v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1982).
24. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1989).
25. Id. at 1209.
26. See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 563 (2d Cir. 2015).
27. See Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, 803 F.3d 1199, 1212 (11th Cir. 2015).
28. See Benjamin v. B & H Educ., Inc., No. 13-CV-04993-VC, 2015 WL 6164891, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-17147 (9th Cir. Oct. 28, 2015); Hollins v.
Regency Corp., No. 1:13-C-07686, 2015 WL 6526964, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2015), appeal
docketed, No. 15-3607 (7th Cir. Nov. 20, 2015).
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the FLSA. The courts should adopt a clearer, more rigid test that finds an
intern not to be an employee under the FLSA if the following three factors
are met: (1) the training is similar to that of which the interns would receive
at an educational institution, (2) the program is designed to benefit the
intern, and (3) the intern does not displace regular employees. This test is
congruent with Congress’s intent of only allowing for narrow exceptions to
overtime and minimum wage compensation under the FLSA. It also creates
a clear legal standard for both employers who wish to utilize internship
programs and individuals who wish to participate in them.
Part I of this Note will provide a brief overview of the growing role that
unpaid internship programs play in private-sector employment and the
current ambiguities that exist in the law regarding compensation. Part II
will provide background on the FLSA and explain the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Portland Terminal. This Part will also examine the WHD’s six-
factor test to determine whether an intern of a private employer is entitled to
compensation under the FLSA. Part III will discuss the various tests and
case law that the different circuit courts have developed. This Part will also
compare the circuit courts that have given greater deference to the WHD
factors against those that have started developing a primary benefits test.
Particular emphasis will be given to the decision of the Second Circuit in
Glatt due to its novelty and its particular applicability to modern-day
internship programs. Part IV will explain the problems with the Glatt test,
including its incompatibility with the policies behind the FLSA, its use of
extraneous factors that distort analysis, and its particular focus on programs
tied to academic institutions. Finally, Part V suggests a rigid three-factor
test that the courts should use in determining if unpaid interns are
considered employees under the FLSA.
I. UNPAID INTERNSHIPS IN TODAY’S SOCIETY
Internships have become an integral part of the modern-day collegiate
and career-recruitment experience. Many employers now expect new
recruits to have internship experience before hiring them and sincerely
believe that internship experiences are the most important factor when
deciding to hire candidates.29 In addition, private companies in various
industries have started to use internships as a recruitment tool.30 Because
the decisions in upcoming cases alleging that unpaid internship programs
29. Human resource professionals recently ranked internship experience as the most important
factor in hiring a candidate. See Joanna Venator & Richard V. Reeves, Unpaid Internships:
Support Beams for the Glass Floor, BROOKINGS INST. (July 7, 2015, 2:18 PM),
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/social-mobility-memos/posts/2015/07/07-unpaid-internships-
reeves.
30. Andrew Soergel, Paid Interns More Likely to Get Hired, U.S. NEWS (May 5, 2015, 5:30
PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/05/05/study-suggests-college-graduates-benefit-
more-from-paid-internships.
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violate the FLSA will greatly impact the future availability of internship
programs, courts should consider the positives and negatives of allowing
internship programs to remain unpaid.
Internship programs have recently seen a large expansion and are
highly sought after positions.31 A recent survey of college seniors from over
seven hundred universities shows that 61 percent of students have had
internship experience and over half of those internships were unpaid.32
However, college students are not the only ones participating in unpaid
internship programs. A range of job-seekers use internships to gain work
experience in an industry without being enrolled in any academic
program,33 including a named-plaintiff in the Glatt case.34 Additionally,
internships are becoming a popular option for older individuals seeking a
change in career.35
The outcomes of unpaid internship cases, including Glatt on remand,
will affect the future availability of these popular programs. For example,
publishing powerhouse Condè Nast canceled their unpaid internship
program after unpaid interns brought a class action against the company.36
Columbia University has also decided it will no longer give students credit
for completing internship programs.37 However, employers and universities
should pause before canceling their internship programs and consider the
positive aspects of internship programs, which include: allowing
participants an opportunity to attain a skill set that will allow them to be
successful in their industry of interest,38 which can be vitally helpful when
finding paid employment or making future career decisions;39 providing
employers with an effective recruitment mechanism for new employees;
and reducing training costs.40 Because of these benefits, private companies
should consider compensating interns rather than canceling the programs so
the benefits to both the company and the interns can be reaped without
encountering the disadvantages discussed below.
31. Id.
32. Venator & Reeves, supra note 29.
33. See Nancy Collamer, Internships Aren’t Just for College Kids, FORBES (Apr. 21, 2014,
11:55 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nextavenue/2014/04/21/internships-arent-just-for-college
-kids/#2715e4857a0b22daa7383903.
34. See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 532 (2d Cir. 2015).
35. See Collamer, supra note 33.
36. See Susan Adams, Why Condè Nast Felt it Had to Stop Using Interns, FORBES (Nov. 24,
2013, 2:39 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/2013/10/24/why-conde-nast-felt-it-had-
to-stop-using-interns/.
37. Zach Schonfeld, Another Blow to Free Labor, Columbia University Halts Academic Credit
for Internship, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 28, 2014, 12:54 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/another-blow-
free-labor-columbia-university-halts-academic-credit-internship-230554.
38. See generally Pologeorgis, supra note 13.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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While internship programs are a growing recruitment tool and can be
beneficial to participants, not providing interns with at least minimum wage
compensation for internship programs can have negative effects on the
labor market and lead to socioeconomic inequalities. For example, unpaid
internship programs can increase unemployment rates by allowing
employees to cycle through as unpaid interns, displacing the regular
workforce with free labor.41 It is estimated that unpaid internships save
companies approximately $600 million a year in money they would
otherwise pay to regular employees.42 While saving private companies
money, not compensating interns has long-term negative effects on the
economy because without income, interns cannot contribute to economic
growth, such as by contributing to social security or accruing capital.43
Additionally, unpaid internships can distort the market view of paid jobs
available because individuals will not realize some of these positions are
unpaid.44 This causes a higher number of individuals to pursue secondary
education in a certain field, increasing the demand and cost of the
educational institutions, but leaving many of the positions available after
graduation to be unpaid.45
Critics of unpaid internships also argue that they increase
socioeconomic inequalities, since unpaid internships offer opportunities for
only those who can afford to work without compensation, which tend to be
individuals from higher socioeconomic tiers.46 Because not all individuals
have family to financially support them through an unpaid internship
program, they are at a competitive disadvantage in certain industries that
heavily utilize unpaid internship programs.47
Courts should take the preceding effects and considerations into
account as they determine a standard for the legality of unpaid internship
programs. Despite the Second Circuit’s decision in Glatt, the state of the
law remains unsettled. Because Glatt was decided on plaintiffs’ and
defendants’ motions for summary judgment, the case was remanded to the
district court for further proceedings using the new considerations
articulated,48 so there has yet to be a determination if the plaintiffs in the
case are employees. Additionally, the plaintiffs in two district court cases in
California and Illinois, Hollins v. Regency Corporation and Benjamin v.
B&H Education, Inc., are appealing decisions in which the district court
41. Id.
42. Melissa Hart, Internships As Invisible Labor, 18 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 141, 143
(2014).
43. Id. at 144.
44. See Pologeorgis, supra note 13.
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. David C. Yamada, The Employment Law Rights of Student Interns, 35 CONN. L. REV. 215,
218–19 (2002).
48. See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 538 (2d Cir. 2015).
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adopted the Glatt test for determining if interns are employees under the
FLSA.49 It remains uncertain whether the Seventh and Ninth Circuits will
follow Glatt or create their own tests based on prior FLSA precedents and
interpretations.
The above discussion illuminates the current uncertainty as to an
intern’s employment status and the importance of creating a clear standard
for private employers so internship programs can continue, while limiting
their potentially detrimental effects. To create such a standard, the courts
must also understand the background of the FLSA and its past
interpretations by both the courts and government agencies.
II. FLSA BACKGROUND
Led by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in a strong push for
government control of hours and wages for all workers, especially children,
Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938.50 Congress, in the declaration of its
policy for the FLSA, stated that the “labor conditions detrimental to the
maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health,
efficiency, and general well-being of workers”51 created various burdens to
the labor markets and interstate commerce.52 In order to ease these burdens
and ensure a minimum standard for workers’ quality of life, Congress used
the FLSA to create federal minimum wage requirements.53 Section 6(a) of
the FLSA established the minimum rates employers must pay to employees
that are “engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce.”54
Much debate has formed around whether section 6(a) protects unpaid
interns.55 The FLSA broadly defines “employee” as “any individual
employed by an employer”56 and defines “employ” as “to suffer or permit
to work.”57 Section 3 of the FLSA provides exceptions to the definition of
employee and, thus, those falling within those exceptions are not subject to
49. See Benjamin v. B&H Educ., Inc., No. 13-CV-04993-VC, 2015 WL 6164891, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 15, 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-17147 (9th Cir. Oct. 28, 2015); Hollins v. Regency
Corp., No. 1:13-C-07686, 2015 WL 6526964, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2015), appeal docketed,
No. 15-3607 (7th Cir. Nov. 20, 2015).
50. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012)). See also John S. Forsythe, Legislative History of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 LAW&CONTEMP. PROBS. 464, 464–66 (1939).
51. FLSA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 202.
52. Id.
53. See 29 U.S.C. § 206.
54. FLSA § 6(a), 29 U.S.C. § 206.
55. See generally Yamada, supra note 47.
56. FLSA § 3(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). The Act defines employer as “any person acting
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee and includes a
public agency, but does not include any labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g).
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the wage and hour requirements stipulated by the Act.58 Specifically, the
term employee does not include:
[(1)] an individual employed by a public agency, . . . [(2)] any individual
employed by an employer engaged in agriculture if such individual is the
parent, spouse, child or other member of the employer’s immediate
family, . . . [(3)] any individual who volunteers to perform services for a
public agency which is a State, a political subdivision of a State, or an
interstate government agency, . . . [and (4)] individuals who volunteer
their service solely for humanitarian purposes to private non-profit food
banks and who receive from the food bank groceries.59
Under the FLSA, Congress created the WHD, a group that advises it on
information related to the minimum wage, cost of living and employment
opportunities, and also gives recommendations for further legislation.60 In
order to prevent the reduction of certain work opportunities presented to
individuals, under section 14(a) of the FLSA, the Secretary of the WHD can
“provide for the employment of learners, of apprentices, and of messengers
employed primarily in delivering letters and messages” at rates lower than
the federal minimum wage.61 This is achieved by the Secretary of Labor
issuing special certificates subject to the limitations provided by the DOL.62
This power granted to the WHD indicates Congress’s desire to give it some
discretion when deciding which individuals are given minimum wage
protections under the FLSA.63
A. THE SUPREMECOURT’S INTERPRETATION OF EMPLOYEE:
WALLING V. PORTLAND TERMINAL CO.
While the Supreme Court has yet to decide directly if unpaid interns are
considered employees under the FLSA, it provided some guidance through
an unpaid trainee case.64 In Portland Terminal, the plaintiffs brought action
against Portland Terminal Co., a railroad company, for not providing them
with minimum wage compensation while participating in a practical
training program to become yard brakeman.65 The training was required for
58. Id. § 203.
59. Id. § 203(e).
60. See id. § 204(d).
61. Id. Although beyond the scope of this Note, a different analysis is used to determine if
unpaid interns are entitled to compensation at nonprofit organizations and public agencies. Interns
engaged by public sector agencies (both state and federal) maybe considered volunteers under
regulations enacted by the DOL. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 553.100–.106 (2010). For nonprofits, FLSA
liability may turn on whether the organization is an enterprise engaged in “a common business
purpose” under the Act. See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec. of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 295–99
(1984) (finding the nonprofit organization to be an enterprise covered by the FLSA).
62. See 29 U.S.C. § 214(a).
63. See generally Forsythe, supra note 50, at 475–76.
64. SeeWalling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947).
65. See id. at 150.
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individuals wishing to be employed as a brakeman for the company and it
typically lasted seven or eight days without any compensation.66 After the
training, the trainees were put on a list and subsequently hired as needed.67
In determining whether the trainees were to be considered employees of
Portland Terminal, the Court started by interpreting the FLSA’s definitions
to determine whether the trainees working relationships constituted
employment.68 The Court discussed the exceptions to minimum wage
compensation under the FLSA69 and explained that the FLSA allows
employers to apply for a DOL certificate granting them an exception to the
minimum wage requirement for handicapped individuals, learners, and
apprentices.70 The Court noted this exception might not apply to plaintiff-
trainees, because it only applies to “learners who are in ‘employment’” and
the definition of employment is found elsewhere in the FLSA.71 Turning to
the FLSA’s definition of “employ,” the Court determined the definition,
while very broad, was “obviously not intended to stamp all persons as
employees who, without any express or implied compensation agreement,
might work for their own advantage on the premises of another.” Here,
based on the following analysis, the trainees did not fall within the FLSA
definition of employees.72
The Court explained that during the training, the trainees observed
experienced brakemen and gradually were permitted to work under close
supervision.73 The trainees did not, however, replace Portland Terminal’s
regular employees.74 This is because the regular employees were required to
stand by and supervise the trainees, and so the trainees’ “work [did] not
expedite the company business, but [could], and sometimes [did], actually
impede and retard it.”75
Lastly, the Court stated that while the trainees did not fall within one of
the FLSA’s narrow minimum wage exceptions, the FLSA itself was not
intended to be so broad as to require Portland Terminal to pay these trainees
minimum wage.76 Such a broad interpretation would entitle individuals,
such as students, to employee status and, thus, minimum wage.77 In
enacting the FLSA, Congress did not intend to punish companies for
providing potential hires with the same training and instruction they could
66. Id. at 149.
67. Id. at 150.
68. See id. at 152.
69. See id. at 151.
70. Id. at 151–52. These are the certificates issued by the Secretary of Labor, discussed supra
in Part II.
71. Id. at 152.
72. See id.
73. Id. at 149.
74. Id. at 149–50.
75. Id. at 150.
76. Id. at 152.
77. Id.
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receive at a vocational school.78 In addition, since Portland Terminal
received no “immediate advantage” from the trainee’s work, the Court
concluded they were not employees under FLSA.79 The WHD would go on
to use the reasoning and considerations from Portland Terminal to create its
own guidelines for determining when unpaid interns are employees under
the FLSA.80
B. THEWHD’S INTERPRETATION OFEMPLOYEE: FACT SHEET #71
In April 2010, the WHD issued Fact Sheet #71: Internship Programs
Under The Fair Labor Standards Act (Fact Sheet #71).81 Its purpose was to
provide employers in the “for-profit” private sector with guidance on when
interns are covered by the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime
requirements.82 Prior to issuing Fact Sheet #71, the WHD had responded to
several opinion letters by reiterating the same six-factor test asserted in Fact
Sheet #71.83 Fact Sheet #71 provides background on the FLSA, stating that
the word “employ” has a broad definition under the FLSA.84 Thus, private-
sector internship programs will likely be considered employment, unless
they satisfy the WHD six factors stated in the Fact Sheet #71.85
The WHD interprets Portland Terminal as holding “that the term
‘suffer or permit to work’ cannot be interpreted so as to make a person
whose work serves only his or her own interest an employee of another who
provides aid or instruction.”86 Therefore, companies can create private
internship or training programs for individuals without providing
compensation so long as such programs serve only the intern’s interest.87 In
order to fall under the narrow nonemployment-trainee exception, unpaid
internships must meet the following six criteria:
78. Id. at 152–53.
79. Id. at 153.
80. See WAGE & HOUR DIV., FACT SHEET #71, supra note 22. While Fact Sheet #71 never
directly refers to Portland Terminal, the WHD borrows language and reasoning from the Court’s
opinion.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See Opinion Letter Fair Labor Standards Act, Dep’t of Labor, 1996 WL 1031777 (May 8,
1996); Opinion Letter Fair Labor Standards Act, Dep’t of Labor, 1995 WL 1032496 (July 11,
1995); Opinion Letter Fair Labor Standards Act, Dep’t of Labor, 1995 WL 1032473 (Mar. 13,
1995); Opinion Letter Fair Labor Standards Act, Dep’t of Labor, 1994 WL 1004761 (Mar. 25,
1994). All letters were inquiries from employers on the application of FLSA to their intern
programs. The letters explain that the Supreme Court held that not all trainees are employees and
provide the six criteria that determine if interns are employees under the FLSA, as affirmed in
Fact Sheet #71. WAGE&HOURDIV., FACT SHEET #71, supra note 22.
84. WAGE&HOURDIV., FACT SHEET #71, supra note 22.
85. Id. The WHD focus for the Fact Sheet is only for “for-profit” private-sector companies
because the FLSA makes exceptions for certain public sector and nonprofit volunteer programs
under section 3(e) as discussed supra Part II at n. 61.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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1. The internship, even though it included actual operation of the
facilities of the employer, is similar to training which would be
given in an educational environment;
2. The internship experience is for the benefit of the intern;
3. The intern does not displace regular employees, but works
under closer supervision of existing staff;
4. The employer that provides the training derives no immediate
advantage from the activities of the intern; and on occasion its
operations may actually be impeded;
5. The intern is not necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion
of the internship; and
6. The employer and the intern understand that the intern is not
entitled to wages for the time spent in the internship.88
The WHD explains that the more an internship program resembles an
educational experience, the more likely the program will fit into the
exception.89 This is especially apparent when there is academic oversight of
the program.90 In addition, if the skill set that the intern gains from the
internship program is transferrable to a variety of different settings beyond
that particular employer, it is more likely to be viewed as training, not
employment.91 The employer must not be dependent on the intern and the
intern should not be performing the same routine work on a regular basis.92
Fact Sheet #71 also provides that if an employer is substituting or
supplementing its workforce with interns, the interns are, at a minimum,
entitled to compensation under the FLSA if their hours in a single
workweek exceed forty hours.93 In the alternative, it explains that if an
intern is participating in job-shadowing exercises in which the intern
performs certain tasks under the close supervision of an employee but
performs little to no actual work, the internship is likely to be viewed as an
educational experience.94
The WHD also states that internships from the onset should be for a
fixed-time period,95 and should not be used by employers “as a trial period
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. Id. The WHD explains that if an intern is performing routine productive tasks such as
clerical work or assisting customers, the fact that they are receiving some benefit from gaining
practical work experience and basic skills does not mean they fall within the FLSA nonemployee
exception as a result of the employer receiving benefits from the interns’ work. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. The WHD explains that the more the supervision of an intern resembles that of an
actual employee, the more likely the internship is to be viewed as employment rather than
training. Id.
95. Id.
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for individuals seeking employment.”96 Thus, if an intern is hired with the
expectation of permanent employment after the internship, the intern is
considered an employee under the FLSA.97
III. THE CIRCUIT COURTS’ INTERPRETATIONS
While the WHD has used Fact Sheet #71 to assert a clear six-factor test
in determining if unpaid interns are employees under the FLSA, not all
circuit courts have invoked that test in related cases.98 However, many
courts have issued rulings dictating when trainees are considered employees
for FLSA purposes,99 and the Court of Appeals for the Second and Eleventh
Circuits have adopted a test with considerations specific to modern-day
internship programs.100
The FLSA decisions in the circuit courts are split, with some giving
deference to the WHD factors, and others adopting the primary benefits
test. The courts that use the WHD factors, such as the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth and Tenth Circuits, do not apply the factors as a rigid checklist,
but rather use them when considering the totality of circumstances
surrounding the training programs at issue.101 Additionally, courts applying
the WHD factors tend to consider the “economic realities”102 of the
situation.103
Alternatively, in applying the primary benefits test, courts analyze
whether the work done in the program is designed to benefit the employer
or the trainee.104 To determine this, the court considers the nature of the
training experience, which includes what type of work the individuals are
participating in, and what experience and skills the workers gain from it.105
The test developed in Glatt is an evolution of the primary benefits test that
provides factors for evaluating which party received the benefit in the
context of modern day internship programs (i.e., if interns receive academic
credit).106 As the explanation of the case law below will show, the court’s
use of either the WHD factors or the primary benefits test in analyzing
unpaid trainee cases can provide useful guidance for modern day internship
programs.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1989).
99. See id.
100. See Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, 803 F.3d 1199, 1212 (11th Cir. 2015); Glatt v. Fox
Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 537 (2d Cir. 2015).
101. See, e.g., Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1027 (10th Cir. 1993).
102. While many circuit courts say an economic realities test must be considered, none explain
what the economic realities test actually involves.
103. See Reich, 992 F.2d at 1027.
104. SeeMcLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1209 (4th Cir. 1989).
105. See generally id.; Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 520 (6th Cir.
2011).
106. See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 537 (2d Cir. 2015).
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A. CIRCUITCOURTSUSING THEWHDFACTORS
1. The Fifth Circuit
In 1982, the Fifth Circuit decided Donovan v. American Airlines, Inc.,
and held that trainees of American Airlines were not entitled to
compensation under the FLSA because they were not employees.107 The
circuit court approved of the district court’s “relative benefits” analysis108
and also used the WHD factors.109 The circuit court balanced the benefits
that American Airlines received with those that the trainees received.110
Since the trainees did not displace any of American Airlines’ regular
employees and did no productive work at the training center, the trainees
gained a greater benefit in attaining eligibility for employment than they
could have attained otherwise.111 The court also noted that the case was
analogous to Portland Terminal; one could simply “change the word
‘railroad’ to the word ‘airline’” and the same conclusion would be
reached.112
Additionally, the court found American Airlines’ training program met
all six of the WHD factors.113 While Donovan seemed to be a hybrid
analysis of both benefits and WHD factors, the following year the Fifth
Circuit affirmed that the WHD’s factors provided the appropriate test in
determining if trainees were employees under the FLSA.114 The court
referenced its recent approval of the test in Donovan and found the WHD
interpretation was entitled to substantial deference by the court.115
2. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit, in Reich v. Parker Fire Protection District, found
that the use of the WHD factors was appropriate to determine if participants
in a firefighter academy were employees entitled to compensation under the
FLSA.116 In Reich, trainees attended the defendant’s academy for classes,
107. See Donovan v. American Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 1982).
108. Id. at 271–272.
109. Id. at 273.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 273 (citing the WHD’s Wage & Hour Manual, which contains the same six-factor
test as provided in Fact Sheet #71).
114. See Atkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 701 F.2d. 1124 (5th Cir. 1983). In Atkins, the court
found individuals in General Motors’ (GM) trainee program were not entitled to employee status
and, thus, minimum wage compensation under the FLSA because the program met all of the
WHD’s criteria. Id. at 1128. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that GM received the
immediate advantage because the two isolated incidents of trainees cleaning fell within the de
minimis exception. Id. at 1129.
115. Id. at 1128.
116. See Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1993).
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tours of the neighborhood, and physical training and simulations.117
Additionally, the trainees helped maintain fire trucks and other firehouse
equipment.118 Only once did the trainees respond to an accident, which
occurred on the way back to the station from a training exercise.119
While the court thought the WHD factors were the applicable legal
standard for FLSA liability, the court rejected the Secretary of Labor’s
argument for a rigid application requiring all six WHD factors be met.120
Rather, the court stated that the test should be applied by considering the
totality of the circumstances.121 It noted that the test was derived almost
directly from the Supreme Court’s decision in Portland Terminal, and that
other circuit courts have used the test in their analysis of employment
status.122 However, a strict application of the test would be inconsistent with
Portland Terminal because the analysis in Portland Terminal does not
“support an ‘all or nothing’ approach.”123 Further, the court explained the
WHD itself recognized (by looking at its introductory language to the WHD
factors) that its factors were meant to be “an assessment of the totality of
the circumstances.”124
In its analysis, the Tenth Circuit looked to its case law precedent
regarding independent contractors, noting that in determining employment
status, it looked at the totality of the circumstances and to the “economic
realities of the relationship.”125 The Tenth Circuit held the WHD factors
were “relevant but not conclusive” in determining whether trainees are
employees for FLSA purposes.126 The court went on to apply each of the
WHD factors to the firefighter trainees,127 and found that the curriculum
taught in the academy was similar to the educational experience a trainee
would receive at any firefighting academy.128 As in other cases, important
considerations were whether the training program was mainly for the
benefit of the trainee and which party received the immediate advantage.129
The trainees in Reich benefitted from the academy because the attendees
acquired skills that would be transferable within the industry as a whole.130
117. Id. at 1025.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1026. The Secretary of Labor brought the case against the fire department on behalf
of the trainees. Id. at 1023.
121. Id. at 1027.
122. Id. at 1026.
123. Id. at 1027.
124. Id. at 1026–27.
125. Id. at 1026.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1027–29.
128. Id. at 1027–28.
129. Id. at 1028.
130. Id. The court rejected the Secretary’s arguments that since the program: duplicated
trainees’ knowledge, allowed them to operate equipment, and created a pool of applicants that the
fire department could hire from, the academy was for the benefit of the employer. Id.
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Additionally, although the firefighter trainees did maintain a fire truck
during their training, this was a supervised portion of the program, and
when the trainees responded to a single incident during their training
period, other qualified firefighters and emergency medical responders were
also present.131
The record in Reich clearly demonstrated that the trainees did not
replace any regular employees at the fire department,132 and the trainees
knew they were not going to receive compensation during their time at the
academy.133 The only factor of the six the academy did not meet was the
fifth, which asks whether there was an expectation of employment upon
completion of the program.134 Considering that the totality of the
circumstances weighed heavily in favor of the trainees not being employees
under the FLSA, the court granted the fire department’s motion for
summary judgment.135
B. CIRCUITCOURTSUSING THE PRIMARY BENEFITS TEST
1. The Fourth Circuit
In McLaughlin v. Ensley, the Fourth Circuit adopted the primary
benefits test to determine the applicability of the FLSA to the trainee-
plaintiffs.136 The Fourth Circuit held that the trainees participating in a five-
day orientation program for Kirby Ensley’s snack-food distribution
company were employees under the FLSA and therefore entitled to
compensation.137 Both Portland Terminal and the Fourth Circuit’s own
precedent under Isaacson v. Penn Community Services, Inc.138 established
that “when ‘the principal purpose of the seemingly employment relationship
was to benefit the person in the employee status,’ the worker could not be
brought under the Act.”139
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1029.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. SeeMcLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1209 (4th Cir. 1989).
137. See id. at 1210.
138. In Isaacson, the Fourth Circuit held that a conscientious objector working in the program,
in lieu of military service, was not entitled to wage and overtime compensation under the FLSA.
The program was created to accommodate conscientious objectors, workers were under
supervision during the entire program, and the program was run by a nonprofit corporation for the
good of the community. Isaacson v. Penn Cmty. Servs., Inc., 450 F.2d 1306, 1311 (4th Cir. 1971).
139. McLaughlin, 877 F.2d at 1209 (quoting Isaacson v. Penn Cmty. Servs., Inc., 450 F.2d at
1308). In his dissenting opinion, Circuit Court Judge Wilkins opined that the district court both
correctly applied the WHD factors to the orientation program and correctly concluded that the
trainees were not employees. He explained that the six-factor test was consistent with Portland
Terminal’s holding, and it deserved deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
566 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 10
The court determined that Ensley received the primary benefit from the
orientation program because he had an opportunity to review if potential
employees would be successful in the position for free, and his regular
employees were aided in their deliveries by the trainees.140 The most
important factor in the court’s analysis in determining which party received
the primary benefit from the program was the nature of the training
experience.141 The court reasoned that the training the individuals received
in Ensley’s program was very limited: the employees did not receive
training comparable to that which they would receive in a vocational
school, and many of the skills they learned were so job specific that the
skills could not be transferrable to other occupations.142 Additionally, the
court noted that all of the trainees were hired after completing the five-day
orientation, suggesting, “they should be considered at-will employees from
the beginning.”143
2. The Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit took a similar approach to McLaughlin in a case
involving unpaid student work at a boarding school in Tennessee.144 In Solis
v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & School, Inc., the DOL brought suit against
Laurelbrook alleging that the school had violated the FLSA’s child labor
provisions.145 The central issue for the court was which standard was
appropriate to determine if the students were employees as defined by the
FLSA.146
The court rejected the DOL’s argument that the application of the WHD
factors was the appropriate standard.147 It stated that the WHD factors
provided a “poor method for determining employee status in a training or
educational setting,” noting that the factors are very rigid and inconsistent
with the Supreme Court’s holding in Portland Terminal.148 Instead, the
court decided that the ultimate inquiry is which party receives the primary
benefit of the program.149
The court chose to use the primary benefits test in determining if the
students were employees,150 since the test’s generality makes it applicable
to many different employee-trainee relationships.151 Further, the court
140. McLaughlin, 877 F.2d at 1210.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See id.
144. See Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 520 (6th Cir. 2011).
145. Id. at 519.
146. See id. at 521.
147. See id. at 525 (the DOL cited the WHD’s Field Operations Handbook, which contains the
same six-factor test as provided in Fact Sheet #71).
148. Id.
149. Id. (the court also rejected the defendant’s argument that students at vocational schools can
never be considered employees).
150. Id. at 529.
151. Id.
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reasoned the test is able to remedy the problems Congress intended to
eliminate with the FLSA.152 Additionally, the court noted that to determine
which party received the primary benefit, it should consider whether the
program displaced regular employees and whether the program provided
students with an educational experience.153
While the school did receive some benefit from the students’ work
performed at the school, the students received both significant tangible and
intangible benefits in gaining hands-on experience and leadership skills that
would make them competitive candidates for trade occupations upon
graduation.154 Additionally, the court explained that the students did not
displace regular employees, the school would be able to continue
functioning without the students’ work, and instructors’ productive work-
time was often disrupted by providing instruction and supervision to
students.155 Thus, the court concluded that the students at the school did not
constitute employees under the FLSA.156
C. THEGLATT TEST
1. The Second Circuit
In July 2015, the Second Circuit, in Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures,
also chose to adopt the primary benefits test and delineated a nonexhaustive
list of related considerations to be used in determining if an individual is an
employee under the FLSA.157 The issue on appeal in Glatt was to determine
under what factual circumstances employers must pay their interns under
the FLSA.158 The plaintiffs argued that the court should adopt an
“immediate advantage” test, which finds interns to be employees whenever
the employer receives an immediate advantage from work the intern has
performed.159 In the plaintiff’s view, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Portland Terminal rested on this determination.160 Defendants argued for a
primary benefits test, which holds that when the interns receive any tangible
or intangible benefits from the employer that are greater than their
contributions to the employer’s operation, an employment relationship is
not created under the FLSA.161
The court began its opinion by discussing the Supreme Court’s decision
in Portland Terminal and the WHD factors, which the lower court had
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 532.
155. Id. at 530.
156. Id. at 532.
157. See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 536–37 (2d Cir. 2015).
158. Id. at 535.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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relied upon.162 The Second Circuit declined to use the WHD factors, noting
they were too rigid to be consistent with Second Circuit’s precedent.163 The
court explained that the WHD factors were developed from the specific
facts in Portland Terminal and were therefore difficult to apply in other
circumstances.164
Instead, the court chose the primary benefits test as the applicable
standard for the determination of employment status under the FLSA.165
The primary benefits test has three important features that made it the
preferable analytical tool for the Second Circuit: the test focuses on what
interns receive for their work, it gives courts the flexibility to examine the
economic realities between the parties, and it acknowledges that interns’
relationships with their employers must be analyzed in a different context
than the typical employer-employee relationship.166 The court went on to
provide its own nonexhaustive seven-factor list to aid district courts in
determining employment status under the FLSA (Glatt test).167 The factors
are:
1. The extent to which the intern and the employer clearly
understand that there is no expectation of compensation. Any
promise of compensation, express or implied, suggests that the
intern is an employee—and vice versa.
2. The extent to which the internship provides training that would
be similar to that which would be given in an educational
environment, including the clinical and other hands-on training
provided by educational institutions.
3. The extent to which the internship is tied to the intern’s formal
education program by integrated coursework or the receipt of
academic credit.
4. The extent to which the internship accommodates the intern’s
academic commitments by corresponding to the academic calendar.
5. The extent to which the internship’s duration is limited to the
period in which the internship provides the intern with beneficial
learning.
6. The extent to which the intern’s work complements, rather than
displaces, the work of paid employees while providing significant
educational benefits to the intern.
162. Id. at 534–35.
163. Id. at 536 (citing Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 326 (2d Cir. 2012)) (internal quotations
omitted) (“The determination of whether an employer-employee relationship exists does not
depend on ‘isolated factors but rather upon the circumstances of the whole activity.’”). The DOL
appeared as amicus curiae in support of the WHD factors in the case. Id. at 535.
164. Id. at 536.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 536.
167. See id. at 536–37.
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7. The extent to which the intern and the employer understand that
the internship is conducted without entitlement to a paid job at the
conclusion of the internship.168
These considerations require judicial balancing, and no single factor is
dispositive.169 Additionally, as the list is nonexhaustive, courts may
consider other relevant factors in appropriate factual circumstances.170 The
court reasoned that its test is faithful to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Portland Terminal because the Supreme Court in no way suggested that any
one of the factors in the railroad case would be determinative in another
workplace.171 The court also noted that its test reflects a central feature of
today’s internship programs: “the relationship between the internship and
the intern’s formal education.”172 The purpose of internships is to integrate
what students are learning in the classroom with skill development in the
real world.173 Lastly, the court stated that this test is better suited for
evaluating today’s modern internship programs rather than a sixty-eight
year old Supreme Court test.174
2. The Eleventh Circuit
In Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia,175 twenty-five former students of
Wolford College brought FLSA violation claims for the work they had done
in clinical programs as a part of Wolford’s master’s program to become
certified registered nurse anesthetists.176 Under Florida law and the Council
on Accreditation for Nurse Anesthesia Educational Programs’ standards,
the students were required to do a minimum of 550 clinical cases to
complete the program.177 The work included completing pre-operation
paperwork, setting up anesthesia equipment, administering patient
medication, preparing rooms, and monitoring parties through the phases of
anesthesia.178 The plaintiffs appealed from a district court decision
declining to use the WHD factors.179
168. Id.
169. Id. at 537.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 537–39.
175. Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, 803 F.3d 1199, 1203 (11th Cir. 2015). Previously the
Eleventh Circuit had adopted the WHD factors and an “economic realities” test in determining if
unpaid interns are employees under the FLSA. See Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc.,
No. 12-12011, 2013 WL 238120, at *2 (11th Cir. Jan. 22, 2013). However, the court made no
reference to the previous unpublished opinion.
176. See Schumann, 803 F.3d at 1202.
177. Id. at 1203.
178. Id. at 1204.
179. See id. at 1207.
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After surveying the existing law and the tests used to determine
employee status under the FLSA, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the Second
Circuit’s Glatt test, finding the test to be the appropriate modern-day
adaptation of the Supreme Court’s factors from Portland Terminal.180 The
Eleventh Circuit then went beyond the Second Circuit’s decision and gave
additional guidance on how the factors should be applied to the facts of a
case.181 For example, in programs in which “the clinical training and the
academic commitment are one in the same,” employers must have a
legitimate reason for scheduling training when school is not in session.182
With regard to the fifth factor (i.e., the internship’s duration limited to its
useful training), the Eleventh Circuit stated that lower courts should account
for the difficulty in designing programs that fit exactly the amount of time
necessary to teach interns new skills.183 Accordingly, courts should
“consider whether the duration of the internship is grossly excessive in
comparison to the period of beneficial learning.”184 Finally, the court opined
that the result of the analysis may not be an “all-or-nothing determination,”
and there may be a portion of the internship that primarily benefits the
student in addition to a portion of the internship from which the employer
takes unfair advantage of the intern.185
IV. THE PROBLEMWITH GLATT
Courts in subsequent employment cases should not adopt the Second
Circuit’s Glatt test because it broadens the purposefully narrow exception
to the definition of “employee” under the FLSA. Additionally, the primary
benefits test is too ambiguous to aid employers in creating internship
programs that comply with the FLSA in part, because the Second Circuit
included unnecessary factors further obfuscating the FLSA analysis.
Further, the test is too tied to internships stemming from formal education
programs to benefit the many different types of internship programs that
exist today.
It would be detrimental for other circuits to adopt the Glatt test because
the test fails to effectuate the purposes of the FLSA. The FLSA defined
“employee” in the broadest sense possible,186 and the Second Circuit
enlarges the narrow exception to that definition by changing the analysis
from whether individuals are working for their own benefit to analyzing
180. Id. at 1212.
181. See id. at 1213.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1213–14.
185. Id. at 1214.
186. With regards to the definition of employee under the FLSA, the Supreme Court stated: “[a]
broader or more comprehensive coverage of employees . . . would be difficult to frame.” United
States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362 (1945).
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who is receiving a greater benefit.187 The Second Circuit has previously
acknowledged that the FLSA was intended to be remedial and should thus
have the widest possible impact on the economy in order to establish
minimum standards in the workplace, strengthen worker’s bargaining
power, and eliminate unfair competition amongst both employers and job
seekers.188 In Glatt, however, the Second Circuit chose to deny FLSA
coverage to a great number of people in United States working in unpaid
internships, who arguably need FLSA protections the most.189
Denying employee status to these unpaid interns denies them more than
just their right to minimum wage and overtime compensation. For example,
the Second Circuit has interpreted most anti-discrimination statutes, such as
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as inapplicable to uncompensated
workers.190 Additionally, the National Labor Relations Act does not cover
unpaid staff191 and some courts have ruled that unpaid interns are not
covered by the Occupational Health and Safety Act as well.192 This leaves
unpaid interns with minimal statutory protection from workplace hazards
and without an ability to collectively bargain for better working conditions.
Additionally, the Second Circuit erred by making job entitlement a
consideration in its FLSA analysis. Creating liability for unpaid internship
programs that entitle an individual to a job at the end of the program would
nullify two of the major benefits of internship programs: (1) that internships
can be used as a recruitment tool, and (2) that they are a way to secure
future employment.193 There is concern that programs where interns are
entitled to jobs at the end of the program will allow employers to replace
existing compensated-training periods with unpaid internships. This,
however, is an unlikely result if courts are ensuring an internship program is
similar to the training provided at an educational institution and will not
displace regular employees.194
Finally, the Glatt test is too closely tailored to internship programs tied
to formal education to be applicable in the wide variety of internship
programs that exist today. The second, third, and fourth considerations in
the Glatt test all reference formal educational programs or academic
187. See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 531–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
District Judge Pauley noted the primary benefits test is not supported by Portland Terminal’s
holding because the Supreme Court relied on findings that the program served only the trainees’
interests. Id.
188. See Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8, 12–13 (2d Cir. 1984).
189. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees et al. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees at 5, Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 791 F.3d 376 (2d Cir.
2015) (No. 13-4478-CV(L), 13-4481-CV(CON)), 2014 WL 3556311, at *5.
190. Id. at 15–16 (citing O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1997)).
191. Id. at 17 (citation omitted).
192. Id. at 19.
193. See generally Pologeorgis, supra note 13.
194. See infra Part V.
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commitments.195 However, many interns, including one of the named
plaintiffs in Glatt,196 are not enrolled in formal education programs during
their participation in private-sector internships. Although comparing
internship programs to vocational institutions, as the Supreme Court did in
Portland Terminal, can be helpful for the FLSA analysis, the Glatt test’s
link to academic credit and the internship’s resemblance to an academic
calendar gives employers a route to improperly broaden the narrow FLSA
exception with no benefit to the interns. For example, in an internship
where an intern is told her or she will not be compensated or entitled to a
job position at the end of the internship, if an employer requires the intern
to receive credit from their academic institution and limits the program to a
time when school is not in session, the employer has already established
that a majority of the Glatt considerations fall in favor of an employment
relationship. The employer therefore has established a strong case against
liability without the need for any analysis of the benefits or training the
intern received.
V. SOLUTION: A CLEAR LEGAL STANDARD
Circuit courts should create a clearer standard that parallels the
underlying goals of the FLSA. This Note recommends that future courts
adopt the first three WHD factors to form a rigid test in determining FLSA
liability. Therefore, the ultimate test should be whether the internship is: (1)
similar to training that would be given in an educational setting; (2) for the
benefit of the intern; and (3) does not displace regular employees. If these
criteria are met, the interns should fall outside the scope of “employee”
under the FLSA, and thus, employers should not have to provide them with
minimum wage and overtime compensation.
While many courts feel the totality of the circumstances should be taken
into consideration,197 a rigid test would provide private employers with a
clearer legal standard, enabling them to create internship programs that
comply with the three factors. Additionally, individuals participating in
unpaid internship programs will have a better understanding of their rights.
Although some courts believe a flexible test better suits the vast array of
internship programs,198 this three-factor test is composed of three broad
factual inquires under which a variety of different factual circumstances
may be considered. A rigid test will not restrain arguments, but will bring
the focus back to if the interns are truly working for their own benefit.
Furthermore, while the courts that use the totality of the circumstances
test assert that all six WHD factors should be considered in determining
195. See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 537 (2d Cir. 2015).
196. See id. at 532.
197. See, e.g., Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026–27 (10th Cir. 1993).
198. See Glatt, 811 F.3d at 536.
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FLSA liability, the bulk of their analysis focuses only on the first three
factors.199 Therefore, it seems the first three considerations are, in essence,
what the courts are using to determine if employers should pay minimum
wage and overtime compensation. For example, the Tenth Circuit in Reich
based its decision on the first three factors by concluding that: (1) the
firefighter curriculum was similar to that which would be taught in any fire
academy; (2) the training was for the benefit of the trainees; and (3) the
trainees did not displace regular employees; thus, the firefighters were not
employees under the FLSA.200 The court determined that the fourth factor,
which asks which party is receiving the immediate advantage, should not be
an independent factor, but rather is part of the benefit analysis in the second
factor.201 The court only briefly mentioned the last two WHD factors and
denied the trainees’ claims, despite the program failing to meet the fifth
factor.202
As to the first recommended factor, since the unpaid trainee exception
to the FLSA was created so employers would not have to pay persons
working to serve only the worker’s own interest,203 unpaid interns, like
students, should gain a skill set they can later utilize in a variety of different
workplace settings. As the Court noted in Portland Terminal, analysis of
whether trainees would receive the same training at a vocational school is
useful because no one would suggest that students performing the same
coursework and undergoing the same learning experiences are employees of
the school under the FLSA.204 A program can still teach policies and
practices particular to the employer and be analogous to an educational
program, provided that it is also teaching fungible skills that can be used
throughout the industry.205
Unpaid internship programs need to be for the benefit of the intern
because the Court in Portland Terminal only intended to create a very
narrow exception to the definition of employees: those who work to serve
their own interest.206 While some courts determine which party receives the
benefit by weighing the benefits to both sides,207 the real focus of the
inquiry should be on the nature of the training.208 For example, interns
199. See, e.g., Donovan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 1982).
200. See Reich, 992 F.2d at 1028 (the court noted that it would consider the immediate
advantage factor with the primary benefit factor to determine the relative benefits to both parties
as a number of other courts have done).
201. Id.
202. See id.
203. SeeWAGE&HOURDIV., FACT SHEET #71, supra note 22.
204. SeeWalling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 153 (1947).
205. See Reich, 992 F.2d at 1029.
206. See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
207. See Reich, 992 F.2d at 1028.
208. See generallyMcLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1210 (4th Cir. 1989). The court stated
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should be mastering skills and not repeatedly be preforming easily learned
tasks (e.g., making photocopies and running office errands). Part of this
analysis is determining if the benefits received by interns were incidental to
working for the company.209 Paid employees receive additional benefits
beyond mere financial compensation (e.g., receiving job references or
learning how to use office equipment), therefore internship programs
should be designed to give interns more skills and benefits than those
received by paid employees to compensate for their lack of comparable
monetary compensation.
As to the third factor, allowing companies to hire interns to displace
regular employees would undermine the FLSA purpose of ensuring a
minimum quality of life for workers.210 As the Court noted in Portland
Terminal, the purpose of trainees is not to “expedite the company
business,”211 and therefore unpaid interns should not be displacing a
company’s paid employees. If a private company would have to hire
additional employees if not for the work provided by unpaid interns, the
interns should receive compensation for the necessary benefit they are
providing the company.212 In addition, if interns are receiving the same
supervision over and feedback on their work as regular employees, it is
likely that an employment relationship exists.213 This requires a factual
inquiry by the courts to determine if interns are provided more supervision,
training, and instruction than that of their paid co-workers to ensure that the
interns are not just being used by employers to avoid hiring additional staff.
CONCLUSION
The future of unpaid internship programs in the United States depends
on the large number of pending cases involving employee status under the
FLSA. Courts must adopt a clear legal standard for liability that effectuates
Congress’s intent when it enacted the FLSA. The Supreme Court’s decision
in Portland Terminal can still provide guidance on what narrow factual
situations qualify as exceptions to FLSA’s definition of “employee.”
Additionally, while several circuit courts have not yet made determinations
on cases involving modern-day internship programs, their analysis in
preceding cases involving unpaid trainees helps provide guidance for
deciding when interns should be paid for their work or when FLSA
violations occur.
While the Second Circuit has recently articulated in Glatt a primary
benefits test for present-day internship programs, and the test has been
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adopted by other courts, the Glatt test is ambiguous and, in certain respects,
contrary to the purpose of the FLSA. Instead of adopting Glatt’s primary
benefits test, courts should establish a clear and rigid legal standard that is
more aligned with the FLSA’s initial intentions. Courts should only find
unpaid interns not to be employees under the FLSA if the first three WHD
factors are met. A rigid standard would improve employers’ statutory
compliance by more easily allowing the creation of programs that do not
violate the FLSA. This, in turn, would also help interns better understand
the protections they are entitled to under the FLSA, therefore better
preventing situations akin to Kyle Grant’s from happening in the future.
Adopting this standard may clear up some of the pending unpaid-intern
litigation and make FLSA liability less ambiguous. Unpaid internship
programs should only be allowed when employers develop programs not to
displace employees, but to benefit interns by teaching them industry wide
skills.
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